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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider one mechanism by which racial categories, racial “common 
sense,” and thus the social organization of race itself, are reproduced in interaction. I 
approach these issues by using an ethnomethodological, conversation analytic approach 
to analyze a range of practices employed by participants of a “race-training” workshop to 
manage the normative accountability involved in referring to the racial categories of 
others when describing their actions, and thus in using racial common sense in talk-in-
interaction. This accountability arises in part because a speaker’s use of a racial category 
to explain someone else’s actions may provide a warranted basis for recipients to treat the 
speaker’s own racial category as relevant for understanding and assessing the speaker’s 
actions. I describe three main ways in which speakers can manage this accountability, 
namely generalizing race, localizing race, and alluding to race. My analysis shows that, 
even in attempting to resist racial common sense in accounting for their own actions and 
those of others, speakers orient to race as a normative framework according to which 
individuals will produce their own actions and interpret those of others, and thus 
reproduce it as relevant for understanding social action. This research contributes to 
advancing knowledge in the fields of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, racial 
studies, and categorical inequality. 
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Introduction 
Social scientists have long recognized that categories of people are central to patterns of 
social action, in large part because members use and orient to membership categories as a 
basis for action, and for interpreting the actions of others (see Raymond and Heritage 
2006 for a review of research in this regard). As a consequence, an understanding of the 
pervasive and enduring nature of social categories (one particularly significant instance 
of which is race) is central to accounting for the maintenance of social structures 
associated with them. 
In this paper, I show that understanding the ways in which racial categories, and 
common sense knowledge about them, are deployed and oriented to in interaction can 
provide insights into the mechanisms through which they are maintained and reproduced. 
I begin by describing a mechanism whereby speakers’ use of racial categories in 
describing the actions of others may result in moral judgments of their own actions in 
terms of their own racial identities. I then employ an ethnomethodological, conversation 
analytic approach to explicate a range of interactional practices that provide evidence for 
the operation of this mechanism, and that may be employed to minimize or mitigate its 
operation. I conclude by examining the significance of these findings for understanding 
the social organization of race, and its reproduction, at the level of individual episodes of 
interaction. These findings contribute to three areas of sociology, namely the study of 
racial discourse, “racial formations” (Omi and Winant 1994), and “durable inequality” 
(Tilly 1998). I briefly discuss the relationship between my study and these areas in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
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The recognition of the importance of studying racial discourse has resulted in the 
accumulation of a substantial and growing body of literature in this area in the past two 
decades (see, for example, Bonilla-Silva 2002; Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, and 
Stevenson 2006; van den Berg, Wetherell, and Houtkoop-Steenstra 2004). This research 
has made important contributions to examining race talk in terms of its implications for 
understanding expressions of racial “attitudes” or prejudice, and for the ways in which 
such expressions relate to broader systems of racial inequality. While the research I report 
in this paper shares with much of the race talk literature an emphasis on fine-grained 
attention to empirical materials, the substantive focus and analytical aims are somewhat 
more basic than those of the abovementioned studies. Specifically, rather than examining 
race talk for its relation to prejudice or racism, I focus on the reproduction of the category 
system on which such social problems rest (cf. Whitehead and Lerner 2009). Since 
prejudice and inequality on the basis of race are underpinned by people’s use of racial 
categories as a basis for social action and distribution of resources, it is important to 
investigate mechanisms through which the relevance of such categories, and hence the 
common sense knowledge associated with them, is reproduced in interaction. 
Omi and Winant’s influential theory of racial formations describes the 
“sociohistorical process through which racial categories are created, inhabited, 
transformed and destroyed” (1994:55). Omi and Winant argue that racial formation 
occurs through “racial projects,” which occur both at the “macro-level” of social 
structural forces, and at the “micro-level” of everyday experience and interaction. While 
the reproduction of widespread notions of race through everyday interactions is thus an 
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important matter in terms of Omi and Winant’s theory, they do not elaborate on the 
mechanisms through which such reproduction of the social organization of race takes 
place, focusing instead largely on racial projects at the level of the state and in social 
movements. In this paper I take up this question of the reproduction of race in interaction, 
identifying and explicating a set of practices that implicate a mechanism through which it 
occurs. 
Tilly’s (1998) study of durable inequality is concerned with accounting for the 
enduring nature of many forms of categorical inequality, i.e., inequality based on social 
categories such as gender, ethnicity and race (also see Massey 2007). Tilly argues that 
changes in prevailing attitudes towards members of “out-group” categories will have 
relatively little effect on durable inequality, while “the introduction of new organizational 
forms – for example, installing different categories or changing the relation between 
categories and rewards – will have great impact.” (1998:15). As a consequence, 
accounting for the mechanisms through which category systems are reproduced is a 
central concern for Tilly, who identifies two mechanisms through which systems of 
categorical inequality are established (exploitation and opportunity hoarding), and two 
mechanisms that reinforce such arrangements (emulation and adaptation). Tilly’s account 
of these mechanisms involves instances in which individuals and organizations, including 
oppressed groups, become invested in or “buy into” the category systems in question. He 
notes that the categories he examines “depend on extensive social organization, belief 
and enforcement,” and that durable inequality “arises because people who control access 
to value producing resources solve pressing organizational problems by means of 
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categorical distinctions. Multiple parties – not all of them powerful, some of them even 
victims of exploitation – then acquire stakes in those solutions” (Tilly 1998:7-8). While I 
am similarly concerned in this paper with examining the reproduction of category 
systems, the mechanism I explicate accounts for how one such category system, race, can 
be reproduced even in the absence of any investment or stake in it on the part of those 
who use it. I turn now to a discussion of the basis of this mechanism in the organization 
of social categories, common sense knowledge, and social action. 
 
Background: Categories, Common Sense Knowledge, and Social Action 
In his pioneering work on social categories, Sacks (1972a; 1995) showed the way in 
which membership categories can serve as repositories for, and organize, bodies of 
common sense cultural knowledge. This common sense knowledge, in Garfinkel’s terms, 
consists of “socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in 
everyday life, and which they assume that other members of the group use in the same 
way” (Garfinkel 1956:185). A consequence of this feature of membership categories is 
that a reference to a category can be treated by speakers and recipients as an account for 
(or explanation of) social action, as a result of the way it mobilizes common sense 
knowledge about that category. For example, Kitzinger (2005a; 2005b); has shown how 
callers to institutional lines (a suicide prevention center and an after-hours doctor’s 
office) used references to kinship categories in order to provide unremarkable, non-
accountable reasons for their actions (cf. Sacks 1972b; 1995; Whitehead and Lerner 
2009). Thus, callers could account for seeking help on behalf of another simply by 
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displaying their relationship to that person through a reference to a kinship category 
(Kitzinger 2005a).  
In the case of many categories, their use as accounts for social action is treated by 
participants and analysts alike as an utterly mundane and unproblematic feature of social 
organization. In fact, this ever-available use of categories can be understood as a social 
resource that enables people to talk about and make sense of their everyday activities in 
apparently smooth and seamless ways, since categories enable the recognizability and 
sensibility of actions (Kitzinger 2005a; Sacks 1995). However, the use of some categories 
to tacitly account for social action is potentially treatable as an objectionable attribution 
of “stereotypical” characteristics to members of those categories (see, for example, 
Stokoe and Edwards 2007). This is especially so for categories such as race, gender and 
sexuality, as a result of additional normative constraints regarding their use that have 
emerged from relatively recent political mobilizations.  
One way in which the operation and consequentiality of these normative 
constraints can be observed is by examining speakers’ practices for managing references 
to race. Specifically, it appears that references to race in describing the actions of other 
people (particularly when they are members of different racial categories than the 
speaker) are recurrently treated as problematic, being produced through a set of practices 
that contrast with Kim’s smooth and unproblematic formulation of a racial self-reference 
in Excerpt 1a: 
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Excerpt 1a: [WG, A, 11:14:19–11:14:29] 
1  KIM: I don’t feel guilty for being white but I feel very sad 
2  (0.7) um (0.3) at what others lose. 
 
These practices for referring to race in describing the actions of others (which I describe 
in the sections that follow) provide evidence for the consequentiality of what I call, 
following Sacks, “categorizing the categorizer.” Sacks (1995, vol. I:45) notes that it may 
be necessary to “categorize the categorizer” in order to understand the “perspective” they 
are taking in categorizing another, and thus what type of person the categorized one 
actually is. For example, if a ten-year-old child categorizes someone as being “old,” then 
the categorized person may be considerably younger than a person who is categorized as 
“old” by an adult (Sacks, 1995, vol. I:45). This demonstrates one way in which references 
to social categories can reflexively implicate the speaker’s status as a member of a 
category in the self-same collection of categories.  
Sacks’ observations about the reflexivity involved in categorization were 
restricted to categories that could be ordered on a scale relative to one another, including 
“categories like age and social class, in contrast to those like race and sex” (Sacks, 1995, 
vol. I:45). I demonstrate in what follows, however, that a distinct but parallel form of 
reflexivity appears to operate with respect to mentions of racial categories (and hence 
possibly a range of other social categories). I thus examine the way in which racially 
categorizing another can make relevant racial categorization of the speaker who did the 
initial categorizing (cf. Sacks 1995, vol. I:45-46). In other words (and in light of the 
above discussion about categories and common sense knowledge, or “stereotypes”), a 
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speaker’s mobilization of common sense racial knowledge through the use of a racial 
category to tacitly explain another’s actions can provide a warranted basis for recipients 
to use the speaker’s own racial membership category in explaining the speaker’s actions 
– thus reflexively mobilizing common sense racial knowledge about the speaker1 (also cf. 
Stokoe and Edwards’ discussion of the “speaker-indexical” nature of racial insults, and 
complaints about them – Stokoe and Edwards 2007:354). 
A further significant feature of “categorizing the categorizer” is that it not only 
concerns recipients’ need to recognize what sort of person is being referred to by the 
categorizer (as Sacks noted), but also implicates potential moral evaluations of the 
categorizer/speaker on the part of recipients (cf. Jayyusi's 1984 description of the links 
between categorization and the moral order). For example, a white speaker who simply 
identifies the race of a person of color in describing some action that person performed 
may be labeled “racist” specifically by virtue of being seen (and heard) as a white person 
attributing a person of color’s actions to that person’s racial identity (and thus as using 
common sense racial knowledge to explain those actions). In this way, a speaker’s 
mention of a racial category in describing, telling, accounting, and so on, can result in 
what the speaker is saying being discounted as “biased” or “racially motivated” on the 
                                                 
1
 This can thus be understood as an extension of what Sacks calls the “consistency rule” for “membership 
categorization devices” (a term Sacks uses to refer to a collections of categories, along with rules for how 
members use these categories – see Sacks 1995, vol. I:246). This rule holds that “if a category from some 
[membership categorization] device’s collection has been used to categorize a first Member of the 
population, then that category or other categories from the same collection may be used to categorize 
further Members of the population” (Sacks 1995, vol. I:246; emphasis in original). 
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basis of the speaker’s own racial identity (cf. Jayyusi 1984; also see Pollner's 1975 
analysis of the way “reality disjunctures” can be sustained as a result of descriptions 
being discounted by reference to the very terms in which they are formulated). 
In light of the systematic potential for difficulties resulting from referring to race, 
one might ask whether such difficulties could be avoided by simply not mentioning race 
at all. Indeed, this “color-blind” approach has become widely popular in recent decades, 
with many seeing it as the best way of dealing with matters of race (see, for example, 
Brown 2003; Cose 1997; Williams 1998 for discussions of "color-blindness"). However, 
a problem with adopting such an approach is that ceasing to attend to race, or to act on 
the basis of race, does not guarantee that others will do the same. As a result, individuals 
who act without considering the possible racial consequences of their actions still face the 
possibility that others might interpret their actions racially, even if they did not have any 
racial intent when they acted. In short, sometimes race is relevant, and speakers who fail 
to appropriately recognize its relevance as they act in interaction with others may face 
interactional difficulties. 
The foregoing discussion implicates dual and competing normative constraints on 
formulations of racial categories in talk: On the one hand, mentioning race may result in 
difficulties if speakers are heard as endorsing the racial common sense associated with 
the categories they are mentioning. On the other hand, failing to acknowledge the role of 
race when it is relevant to do so may also result in difficulties. One way in which the 
consequentiality of these constraints for everyday actions can be observed is by 
examining practices speakers use for producing racial categorizations in their talk. How 
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can they introduce race in such a way as to demonstrate that they do not endorse the 
common sense knowledge associated with it? How can they manage the implications of 
their own racial category for what they are doing when introducing race into their talk? 
How can they display, and allow for, recognition of the relevance of race through their 
talk while showing that it was others, rather than themselves, who chose to make it 
relevant by using it as a basis for action? 
The normative constraints around references to race that I have identified may be 
interpreted as providing for an over-arching motivation for speakers to exercise caution in 
referring to race, and thus to use the practices that I have referred to above (and describe 
in detail below) in doing so. However, while there is no doubt that individuals do have 
motives, the practices I examine do not depend on the motives of individuals for their 
production – instead, the consequentiality of the social organization of “categorizing the 
categorizer” is what allows for such motives, and what makes them visible in particular 
interactional moments. Thus, in the remaining sections, my analysis focuses on speakers’ 
production of practices for managing references to race, and on the features of the social 
organization of race they implicate, rather than on the motives speakers may or may not 
have for producing them in particular cases. In this sense, my concern is with the 
normative accountability (cf. West and Fenstermaker 1995) involved in referring to race, 
and with the practices that speakers may use to manage this accountability, rather than 
with whether their use of such practices is conscious, intentional or calculated.  
 It is also important to note that this normative accountability need not operate in 
every conceivable interactional context. In some contexts – a meeting of the Ku Klux 
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Klan being an extreme example – the use of racial categories for pejorative inferences 
and discriminatory actions is treated as completely acceptable and appropriate. In such 
cases, speakers don’t face the same kind of normative constraints regarding their use of 
race that speakers in more “liberal” or anti-racist environments would face. For this 
reason, the constraints around referring to race that I have identified could be seen as 
particular to contexts characterized by anti-racist norms. However, as I show in the 
following sections, examining how speakers manage references to race in those contexts 
in which speakers are oriented to the accountability of doing so offers insights into the 
way in which racial common sense can be reproduced even in contexts in which anti-
racist norms operate. 
The practices I describe below constitute ways in which speakers can introduce 
formulate racial categorizations of others, while managing the normative accountability 
(resulting from “categorizing the categorizer”) involved in doing so. I argue that these 
practices are consequential for understanding the social organization of race in two ways. 
First, they reveal some linkages between individual agency and social structure, 
specifically concerning the ways in which people use or orient to (and thereby reproduce) 
racial common sense, while at the same time managing how their own actions will be 
understood in light of it. Second, they demonstrate the importance of the ordinary 
interactional resources that are deployed to perform this management, and thus the value 
of a close examination of interaction for understanding how people “do race” (West and 
Fenstermaker 1995), and perhaps more importantly, use race, in interaction. 
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Data and Method 
Since the normative constraints I have described above are particularly relevant in 
interactional contexts in which anti-racist norms are prevalent, such contexts are obvious 
places to examine in order to investigate how speakers manage the resulting 
accountability of referring to race. A prime example of such a context is what can broadly 
be described as “diversity training,” “racial sensitivity training” or simply “race-training.” 
Such training sessions are designed to engage individuals in discussions about the 
problems of race and racism, with the ultimate aim of bringing about individual, 
institutional, or societal change with respect to these problems. As such, they are contexts 
that are characterized by strong anti-racist norms, with many such sessions actually being 
referred to by those who run them as “anti-racist training.” Although race has an 
occasion-based omni-relevance in such settings, meaning that race could be heard as 
topically relevant for virtually everything that participants say, speakers are still 
accountable for how and when they introduce race into their talk. Participants must thus 
balance the task of speaking openly about their experiences and views with respect to 
race against the risk of being negatively evaluated or sanctioned should they be heard as 
inappropriately using race to account for action. The race-training context thus represents 
a natural “home” for practices speakers may use in managing their use of references to 
race in anti-racist environments, making it a “perspicuous setting” (Garfinkel 2002) in 
which to investigate such practices. In light of this, I use video data of a race-training 
workshop in order to investigate these matters.  
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The workshop from which the data excerpts presented below were drawn, which 
was a full day in duration, was originally videotaped in 2001 with the intention of 
producing a documentary film. However, the film has as yet not been produced, and the 
organizers of the workshop gave approval for the tapes to be used for research purposes. 
A total of three different cameras were used in order to record the two groups that 
convened in the morning, and the larger group that met in the afternoon. During the 
morning session, the participants, all of whom were invited to take part in the workshop 
and did so voluntarily, were divided into a “White Group” (consisting of two facilitators 
and six participants), and a “People of Color Group” (consisting of two facilitators and 
five participants), which engaged in separate two-hour sessions. In the afternoon session 
the participants and facilitators from both groups formed one larger group that engaged in 
a two-hour “group dialogue” in which the participants from both of the previous sessions 
took part in an open-ended discussion of the issues that each group had dealt with 
separately in the earlier sessions. Throughout all the workshop sessions, the facilitators 
generally adhered to the aim, which they stated explicitly at the beginning of each 
session, of guiding a discussion on the issues of race and racism, rather than directing the 
participants towards pre-specified outcomes. 
Analysis was conducted using an ethnomethodological, conversation analytic 
approach. Consistent with the analytic focus described above, this approach is centrally 
concerned with explicating actors’ practices (i.e., what they do and how they do things), 
rather than with their motivations (i.e., why they do things). Moreover, this approach 
focuses on analyzing utterances as public actions (rather than, for example, treating them 
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as indicators of underlying psychological processes), and thus treats talk as a form of 
public social action, analyzing it primarily for its social and interactional import, rather 
than for what it reveals about any particular individual (Clayman and Gill 2004). The 
analysis was thus conducted by viewing the video data and collecting candidate instances 
of speakers’ attempts to manage their explicit and tacit references to race, or to particular 
racial categories. These candidate instances were arranged into collections of what 
appeared to be discrete practices for performing such management. Emerging hypotheses 
were tested and refined in an iterative manner by applying them to the remaining portions 
of the data set, as well as repeatedly re-viewing and re-examining the already-viewed 
data in order to check and refine the descriptions of how these practices work. The data 
excerpts analyzed in detail below were chosen because they exemplify the range of 
practices for managing the normative accountability described above, while 
demonstrating as far as possible (within space constraints) the variations in the actions for 
which each practice could be used. 
Each excerpt presented in the sections that follow
2
 is preceded by information 
regarding the session in which it took place (WG = “White Group;” “PCG = “People of 
Color Group;” GD = “Group Dialogue”), the camera the interaction was recorded on and 
transcribed from (A, B or C) and the time segment from the camera’s counter 
                                                 
2
 A list of the conversation analytic conventions used in producing transcripts of the data can be found at 
http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/leftnav/publications/journals/social_psychology_quarterly/transcript_convent
ions 
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corresponding to the excerpt. The facilitators are identified with the letter “F” followed 
by a number (1-4), and the participants’ names have been replaced by pseudonyms. 
 
Generalizing Race 
A first way in which speakers can manage the normative accountability resulting from 
“categorizing the categorizer” is by generalizing race, which involves formulating race in 
general so as to show that no specific racial category has special explanatory properties. 
One practice through which speakers can generalize race is list construction (Jefferson 
1990). Formulations of this sort consist of a list of racial categories, followed by what 
Jefferson (1990) calls a “generalized list completer,” which is a word or phrase that 
shows that there are other relevant list items that need not be explicitly specified. Lerner 
(1994:29) suggests that “one might think of the generalized list completer as a 
generalizing list completer” (emphasis in original), since it serves to transform a list from 
one consisting of the list items themselves, to one referencing the general class of items 
to which those on the list belong. Hence, a list of racial categories followed by a 
generalized list completer is a method for referring to all possible racial categories. In this 
way, speakers can use race in general as an account while showing that their comments 
are not designed to single out any particular racial category or categories for criticism. 
This practice is exemplified by Excerpt 1b, in which Sammy disagrees with the 
description of (white) “privilege” that Kim has produced in the previous stretch of talk. 
Just as Kim’s experience as a white person constitutes the basis for her claims about 
privilege, Sammy’s denial of white privilege implicates his experience as a white person. 
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As a consequence, his disagreement is potentially vulnerable to being treated as self-
serving. The design of Sammy’s disagreeing turn addresses this potential problem 
through the use of a list of racial categories in constructing the counter-claim that racial 
privilege is situational and variable.  
Following a lengthy pause (line 3) after the end of Kim’s description of the ways 
in which she is able to use her (white) “privilege,” and hence her sadness “at what others 
lose” (lines 1-2), Sammy (who has previously mentioned that he lives in San Diego) 
begins to propose that “where you live” (line 5) can “cause you to look at things quite a 
bit differently” (lines 7-8). As evidence for this claim, he sets up a contrast between the 
location in which the workshop is taking place (a small city), and a “much more urban 
larger city area” (line 9). In characterizing the types of neighborhoods that might be 
found in such an area, Sammy lists three racial categories (“Hispanic,” “African 
American” and “Asian”, lines 11-12), followed by a generalized list completer 
(“whatever the case may be,” lines 12-13), thereby producing an inclusive list of all 
possible racial categories of which he is not a member. 
 
Excerpt 1b: [WG, A, 11:14:19–11:15:08] 
1 KIM: I don’t feel guilty for being white but I feel very sad 
2  (0.7) um (0.3) at what others lose. .hh 
3  (3.5) 
4 SAM: (Well) (.) I think oftentimes people are depending upon 
5  (0.5) y’know, where you live, (.) (I been) driving  
6  around here for you know, .hh for the last day and a  
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7  half or so, .hh um: can (.) eh eh eh  can cause you to  
8  look at things quite a bit differently too. <I mean when 
9  you live in a- in a- in a much more urban .hh larger  
10  city area where you have .hh you know, pockets of:  
11   either you know Hispanic neighborhoods or: .hh  
12   predominantly African American or Asian or whatever the  
13    case may be, there are places whe:re (1.2) where I-  
14  where I don’t have the privilege(h)s .h[h (.) that I  
15 (?):                                         [Mm hm. 
16 SAM: would traditionally.  
 
By using a generalized list in this way, Sammy claims that the racial organization 
of neighborhoods, regardless of the specific racial category involved, creates places in 
which racial “out-groups” are unwelcome, and therefore lack privileges. Sammy thus 
treats racial privilege as a situational property of whichever category is the “in-group” in 
any given neighborhood, rather than being tied to whiteness in the way that Kim had 
proposed. This logic serves as a basis for Sammy to complain about how he would likely 
be treated in certain neighborhoods, but by formulating his complaint in this way he 
conveys that his claims are based not on his status as a white person per se, but on his 
status as a racial “out-group” member in such neighborhoods. Moreover, he shows that 
his complaint arises from the racial organization of neighborhoods in general, rather than 
from behavior associated with any specific racial category. In this way, he 1) 
acknowledges the relevance of race in general for the allocation of privilege, 2) denies 
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that he, as a white person, is particularly privileged, and 3) avoids blaming members of 
any particular racial category for denying him privileges.  
A second instance of this practice is shown in Excerpt 2, which is drawn from the 
“Group Dialogue” component of the workshop. In this case, Lupe (who identifies as a 
Latina) produces a list in the course of claiming that it is important to get to know people 
as individuals, as opposed to seeing them as members of a racial category. As she begins 
to refer to the importance of this “individualism” (line 1), she refers back to something 
one of her recipients (Sammy, who is white) has previously said about this matter, 
turning towards him and addressing him by name as she does so (lines 2-3). By doing 
this, she displays her engagement and agreement with what he has said previously, 
offering an agreeing elaboration of his remarks (lines 1-3). In offering this endorsement 
of Sammy's view, however, just what Lupe is agreeing with may be ambiguous: it is 
possible that she could be heard as aligning with his remarks as being especially relevant 
for him, as a white person, i.e., suggesting that white people in particular should view 
others as individuals. In this case, her status as “a person of color criticizing white 
people” would become relevant, and the alignment with Sammy that her agreement 
otherwise instantiates would be undercut. She avoids this possible implication, however, 
by formulating her agreement with his remarks as relevant for persons as such, 
independently of race. Specifically, in her point about the importance of “getting to know 
that person on one on one” (lines 3-4), she asserts that her point applies to members of all 
racial categories by producing a list of categories (“whether .hh you’re black you’re 
Racial Common Sense in Interaction  20 
white, or you’re Asian=or (.) you’re brown,” lines 4-5),3 followed by a generalized list 
completer (“whatever,” line 5).  
 
Excerpt 2: [GD, A, 2:42:31-2:42:41] 
1 LUP: So individually, (0.5) that’s where the individualism 
2  ((turns towards Sammy)) comes from that you were talking  
3  about Sammy is uh (.) getting to know that person on one  
4   on one whether .hh you’re black you’re white, or you’re 
5   Asian=or (.) you’re brown, whatever um: (0.7) ((swallows)) 
6  it’s- it’s getting to know them an- and relating to them  
7  in that way, ((continues)) 
 
Two features of the positioning of the list she constructs are particularly 
significant. First, she produces the list just after her attribution of an aspect of what she is 
saying to what Sammy had previously said. This suggests that the list is designed to 
display to Sammy (and the rest of her recipients) that in attributing this concept to him 
she is not implying that it is especially relevant to him, or to other white people. Second, 
she pauses briefly, inserting the list parenthetically (cf. Mazeland 2007), and thus treating 
it as something important enough to say at the earliest possible moment, rather than 
waiting until she completed her point before adding this component. She thus displays 
                                                 
3
 It is noteworthy that the list of categories Lupe produces exactly coincides with the categories represented 
in the “Group Dialogue” in which she is participating. This may reflect extra care taken on her part to 
avoiding omitting any of the categories with which her recipients identify. 
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her orientation to the importance of showing as soon as possible that what she is saying 
about building relationships across racial boundaries is something that members of all 
racial categories should do. 
By using a generalizing list in this way, Lupe discounts any possible implication 
that she is criticizing members of a particular racial category for failing to work at cross-
racial friendships. Such an implication would diminish or undermine the alignment she is 
ostensibly offering by making relevant her status as a person of color criticizing white 
people. Her use of a generalizing list thus limits the degree to which race is likely to be 
treated as relevant for understanding her actions, even as she produces a list of racial 
categories. In producing a list in this way, she treats her own race as a potential barrier to 
displaying alignment with a co-participant of a different race, while working to overcome 
this barrier.  
 In both of the above cases, and indeed all cases of the list construction practice 
collected in the data, the speakers employing this practice in formulations of race did so 
in the course of making broad generalizations about the social organization of race.
4
 This 
demonstrates the way in which this practice is best suited for use in making generalized 
                                                 
4
 It is also worth noting that, in both Excerpt 1b and Excerpt 2, the speaker’s use of the term “whatever” is 
consistent with the outcome achieved by the racial formulations in both of these cases. Specifically, it 
explicitly claims that the specific racial group in question is not relevant to the claims they are making, by 
proposing that “whatever” additional categories were included in the list, the speaker’s claims would 
remain valid. In addition, “whatever” may carry a dismissive connotation that further serves to support the 
assertion that the specific racial category doesn’t matter. 
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claims about race as a form of social organization per se, rather than describing specific 
racial categories or incidents. It is further notable that in the cases I have examined, the 
speakers’ use of this resource displays their tacit orientation to their positions within a 
racial structure. That is, a white speaker disavowed the relevance of race in an utterance 
designed to deny racial privilege as specifically relevant for whites in Excerpt 1b, while a 
speaker of color used the practice in a situation where an utterance offered as an 
agreement was vulnerable to being heard as a complaint about white people in Excerpt 2. 
In the following section, I describe a set of practices through which speakers can 
formulate specific racial categories, while limiting their use of those formulations to 
specific circumstances or incidents – and I continue to attend to the ways in which the 
deployment of such practices is sensitive to speakers’ orientations to their position within 
a racial structure. 
 
Localizing Race 
In the following sections I examine two practices for producing “localized” racial 
formulations, namely qualifying racial references, and producing race as an 
“afterthought.” By using these practices, speakers can display a racial formulation to be 
contingently included as a result of its relevance for the local interactional context, rather 
than being produced gratuitously. In this way, they provide a way of showing the use of 
race as an account for action to be limited to the particular case or occasion being 
described.  
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Qualifying Race 
The use of a qualifier prior to a reference to race is shown in Excerpt 3. In this case, 
Megan suspends her utterance to parenthetically insert a qualifier as a preface to a racial 
formulation (cf. Lerner 1996; Mazeland 2007). She does this in the course of a response 
to another participant’s story about his father’s experience of believing he had been 
discriminated against because he was white.
5
 In her response, Megan (who identifies as 
white) describes the effects that being told by her family about her father’s negative 
experiences with people of color had on her on her own racial attitudes as she was 
growing up. 
 
Excerpt 3: [WG, A, 11:21:18–11:24:00]  
1 MEG: I would say that I- I actually had a similar experience  
2  in terms of growing up that my- my father had (0.6)  
3   a: a difficult situation or experience with (.) in this  
4   case particularly an African American person. .hh And I  
5   will say that one of the things that- that it impacted  
6  me on is that I too I think was raised with sort of 
7  this (.) in one breath, (0.3) everyone’s treated equal, 
8  .hh yet (.) at the s- by the same token, (0.2) the  
9  examples that I was ever given about (0.2) when my white 
10  father was impacted by someone it was by a person of 
11  of color and I think that that very much played .hh for  
                                                 
5
 See Whitehead and Lerner (2009) for an analysis of Megan’s references to her father, particularly her 
reference in lines 9-10 to “my white father.” 
Racial Common Sense in Interaction  24 
12  me growing up about what my (.) ideas are a- ideas are 
13   and have been about .hh u:m (0.4) people of color: (.)  
14  sort of victimizing my family. 
 
 By following her characterization of a particular “difficult situation or 
experience” (line 3), with the word “with,” Megan initially projects that she is on course 
to formulate the actor(s) involved in the situation. However, she then suspends her 
utterance to insert the qualifier “in this case particularly” (lines 3-4), before going on to 
produce the initially projected formulation “an African American person” (line 4). In 
addition, the micro-pause prior to the production of this qualifier and the rise in the pitch 
of Megan’s voice as she produces the word “in” (line 3) further mark it as a parenthetical 
departure from the formulation she was initially headed towards. In this way, the qualifier 
is marked as being arrived at as the result of an in-the-moment adaptation to the specifics 
of the circumstance she is reporting. 
By prefacing the racial formulation in this way, Megan treats the specific racial 
category concerned as incidental to this particular case, and shows that she is not 
attempting to generalize beyond this case or treating the victimization of her father as a 
“category bound” behavior (Sacks 1995) for people of this racial category. Megan’s 
orientation in this regard is further displayed as she goes on to speculate about the effect 
that her father’s systematic mentions of the racial categories of people who mistreated 
him had on her views as she grew up: by suggesting that the mere disclosure of the racial 
categories of her father’s “victimizers” may have influenced her views of people of those 
categories, she explicitly displays her understanding that a reference to a category may be 
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hearable as proposing that category to be an account for action. Thus, by using a qualifier 
in this way before referring to a racial category, Megan avoids producing a racial 
formulation similar those she is reporting her father as having (problematically) 
produced. In this way, she re-tells her father’s story while resisting the same racialized 
inferences, including inferences about her own racial motivations as a white person 
referring to people of color, that were available to her as a recipient when her father told 
the story. This enables her to admit to her own racial prejudices, while simultaneously 
accounting (and thereby mitigating responsibility) for their development.  
 
Racial “Afterthoughts” 
Localized racial formulations can also be produced by re-doing an already-adequate 
reference to a person to include a more specific (racial) formulation, thus treating the 
inclusion of race as an “afterthought”6 to the formulation. This is illustrated by Excerpt 4, 
in which Darlene (who has self-identified as black, and has disclosed that she was born in 
Jamaica and lived there until her teens) describes an incident that occurred while she was 
working at a customer service desk in a department store, and a customer made it clear to 
her that she was not welcome in the United States. 
 
Excerpt 4: [PCG, B, 11:26:12-11:26:51] 
                                                 
6
 It is important to emphasize that the term “afterthought” is used here to convey the way in which a 
speaker displays an utterance to have been changed in mid-course, rather than as a claim about the 
speaker’s psychological processes or motivations for changing the utterance in any given case. 
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1 DAR: And so (1.0) I remember one day I was there and dis  
2   woman came, ºthis:º African American woman an .hhh she  
3  was upset about somethi:ng, something that went wrong at  
4  the register and  
5 (?): (Mm.) 
6  DAR: you know they sent her to the service desk and she  
7   ca:me, .hhh and so in my (0.4) nice little accent, which  
8   I see you notice (>hasn’t gone away as yet<) but back  
9   then (.) I had an accent. .hhh And so: in my nice little  
10  accent tryna explain to he:r, you know, the policies and  
11  everything and she said (0.5) .hh ya know she said “You:  
12  damn (w-) West Indians,” you know “why don’t you go back  
13  to whe:re the hell you come from and learn to speak and  
14  everything,” .hhh an:d (.) of- at that point it hit me  
15  it’s like it h:it me all of a sudden that I was .hhh I  
16  was not even in my comfort zone you know ((continues)) 
 
In referring to the customer in this incident, Darlene first refers to her as “this 
woman” (line 1), before repairing (see Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977) to insert her 
race (“this: African American woman,” line 2). By inserting a reference to race in this 
fashion, Darlene treats the racial formulation as a “second choice,” thereby suggesting 
that its inclusion was contingent on its particular relevance for her story. In other words, 
she shows that, rather than gratuitously invoking the woman’s race, she has done so in 
this case through an in-the-moment choice, or “afterthought,” as a result of its particular 
relevance for her description of this incident. Darlene’s production of race as an 
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“afterthought” in this way enables her to display that the woman’s racial (and citizenship) 
category was a relevant feature of this incident and its impact on her,
7
 while resisting 
potential inferences that she routinely (and gratuitously) racially identifies people, and 
therefore routinely treats race as relevant for understanding behavior. 
By using the practices I have described in this section, speakers can display that 
their use of a racial formulation was locally occasioned and recently arrived-at. This 
serves to circumscribe the extent to which they could be heard (and responded to) as 
treating race as an account, by showing it to be either completely incidental, or limiting it 
to the particular case they are describing. Perhaps as a by-product, these practices suggest 
that speakers who use them do not routinely or gratuitously use race when it is not 
warranted or might be deemed inappropriate. 
Having examined a range of practices through which speakers can refer explicitly 
to racial categories while managing the normative accountability of doing so I now turn 
to an explication of the use of tacit racial formulations, in the form of allusions to race, in 
order to manage this accountability (cf. Lerner 2003 on "explicit" versus "tacit" 
practices). 
 
                                                 
7
 Prior to this excerpt, Darlene has discussed her own racial identity and affiliation with “black Americans” 
in recounting her experiences of working in the same department store. Her identification of the woman’s 
race in this case may thus serve to convey the added impact that Darlene experienced as a result of being 
discriminated against by someone she would ordinarily have considered to share her racial identity.  
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Alluding to Race 
Allusions to race provide a way by which speakers can imply or “plant” a racial meaning 
in their talk to convey it indirectly and inexplicitly, without saying it “in so many words” 
(cf. Schegloff 1996). Talking allusively, rather than saying something directly, requires 
recipients to track not just what has been said, but also what has been conveyed 
allusively, in order to make sense of an utterance. The resulting distribution of authorship 
(Goffman 1981; Lerner 2001) may provide a means for managing the formulations of 
others’ racial categories. In the discussion that follows, I describe one practice that can be 
employed to allude to race, namely posing puzzles about actions that require 
explanations. That is, by describing actions in such a way that a puzzle is posed regarding 
why an actor behaved in such a way, speakers can make relevant an explanation or 
account for the behavior. If these puzzles are posed in sequential environments in which 
race has already been referred to, while discounting other possible solutions to the puzzle, 
race becomes available to recipients as the “obvious” solution for understanding the 
conduct in question (cf. Sacks' account of "Job's Problem" - Sacks 1995, vol. I:412). 
Thus, recipients can make sense of the actions, and solve the puzzle, only by using 
common sense racial knowledge to infer the racial category, and hence motivations, of 
the actor. This practice is exemplified by Excerpt 5, in which a facilitator tells a story 
about his experience of trying to open a bank account. Just prior to telling this story, this 
facilitator has reported that he is currently watching his daughter have to come to terms 
with the implications of being “a black woman,” and has noted how difficult it is for him 
to watch, even though he himself grew up “a black man.” By telling a story shortly after 
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self-categorizing in this way, the facilitator invites his recipients to hear the story as 
exemplifying the implications of his status as “a black man,” as thus to hear his racial 
category as relevant in accounting for what happened in the story. 
 
Excerpt 5: [PCG, B, 12:02:18-12:02:47] 
1 F4: U::m I- I used to tell a story abou:t ((sniffs)) goin  
2  to the- (.) to the ba:nk, (0.4) u::h a::nd tryin tuh get  
3  a:: corporate account for a company >for the dialogue  
4  consultants< gettin a corporate account, .hh and havin  
5   problems with thee manager because he thought I was  
6   tryin tuh open a fraudulent account. .hhh U:m (0.8) hh  
7  a:nd (0.8) thinkin >you know< I have no idea why this  
8  guy thinks that. But no:w, even (.) with that story I  
9  mean (you all will find out) the older ya get the more  
10  gray ya get ya think ya know peop[le gon’ lea::ve you  
11 LAU:                                  [Mm hmm. 
12 F4: alone. 
 
In his story, the facilitator recounts that the bank manager accused him of trying 
to open a fraudulent account (lines 5-6). Since such accusation are only relevant when 
based on some kind of warrant or evidence of wrongdoing, this report establishes a 
puzzle about what cause the bank manager may have had for making the accusation. 
Moreover, the facilitator himself explicitly treats the bank manager’s actions as puzzling 
(lines 7-8), and claims a lack of knowledge about any explanation for them. In addition, 
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he has discounted any possible notion that the bank manager’s accusation was in any way 
valid, by showing that he was at the bank for thoroughly legitimate reasons, to open an 
account for the same group that was responsible for organizing the workshop of which 
this interaction was a part (lines 2-4). Recipients can solve this puzzle, however, by 
applying common sense racial knowledge to it. Since the facilitator has already made his 
status as “a black man” relevant, and in accordance with Sacks’ consistency rule, 
recipients could make sense of the bank manager’s actions by inferring that he was a 




  By alluding to the relevance of race for understanding the bank manager’s 
actions, rather than claiming it to be so more explicitly, the facilitator is able to make an 
understanding of racial discrimination available to his recipients without explicitly 
identifying the race of the bank manager. In this way, the facilitator can make inferences 
about the bank manager’s racial motivations available, while attenuating potential 
inferences about his own racial motivations, which would become available to his 
recipients if he explicitly identified the bank manager’s racial category or ascribed it as 
the cause of his actions. In addition, he displays in the course of his report that he did not 
                                                 
8 The recipients may well have been able to make this inference even if the facilitator had not referred to 
his status as “a black man” just prior to telling this story, since they already know (and have constant visual 
access to) his racial identity. The facilitator’s mention of his race thus demonstrates the explicit way in 
which he makes race available as the solution to the puzzle, even when it might already have been the 
obvious solution had he not done so.  
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jump to any conclusions about the motivations (including possible racial motivations) of 
the bank manager, but in fact was unable to find an account for his actions (see lines 7-8). 
In this way, he displays to his recipients that he is not paranoid or over-sensitive when it 
comes to matters of race (cf. Jefferson 2004; Sacks 1995), but instead is cautious about 
making accusations of racism, allowing his recipients to reach that conclusion themselves 
rather than directly claiming it to be the case. Alluding to race in this way thus enables 
the facilitator to show that it was not him, but rather the bank manager, who was 
attending to race and acting on the basis of it on this occasion. 
A second, more complex, instance of the use of a puzzle about an action requiring 
explanation is shown in Excerpt 6. In this excerpt, Sammy responds to a facilitator’s 
prompt to provide an example to illustrate the claims about his lack of racial “privileges” 
in certain situations (see Excerpt 1b) by telling a story about an apparently racially 
motivated attack. As he begins his story, he refers to the location of the neighborhood in 
which the events took place (line 5) and describes it as a “tough neighborhood” (lines 7 
and 9), before explicitly (as an “afterthought”) identifying his friend as “a white guy” 
(lines 9-10).
 9
 He thus establishes a storytelling environment in which recipients can 
inspect his friend’s racial category for how it might explain the events he goes on to 
describe in the story. 
 
Excerpt 6: [WG, A, 11:17:13–11:18:20] 
                                                 
9
 Further analysis of Sammy’s racial identification of his friend is provided in Whitehead and Lerner 
(2009).  
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1   SAM: I’d been out here for about a year, (0.5) u:m (0.3) and  
2  a guy I went to high school with came out here from 
3  Wisconsin an’ .hh a:n’ u:m (0.4) pt .hh he was a: (.) 
4  motorcycle mechanic an’ got a jo:b down in oh jeez  
5   where was it? (0.6) U::m way down off of Imperial. 
6 F2: Mm hm. 
7 SAM: .hh u:m (.) y- you know where that is [an: an that is a  
8 F2:                                       [Mm hm. 
9   SAM: tough neighborhood. .hh u::m, a::nd (.) I mean he was a  
10   white guy, (0.3) and was told by: people that he worked  
11  with, .hh to not get caught here after dark. (.) And he  
12  did one night. 
13  (.) 
14 F2: Mm. 
15 SAM: .h and he pulled in he was it was a Friday night he was  
16  on his way to a game (.) .h u:h in uh >it was< one of  
17  the indoor soccer games an’ he stopped at a seven-eleven  
18   to buy a six-pack of beer. (1.0) An:d wa:s: >put in the<  
19   hospital. Stabbed. Beaten over the head with a pipe an’  
20   this an’ that. And was told .hh dheh! “What are you  
21   doing here?” Uh heh. [“You shouldn’t be here.” An:d so: 
22 F2:                      [Mm.  
23 SAM: y’know eh- en it- en it does exist. An:’ you know, I e-  
24  I- it didn’t make it didn’t make me hate? .hh or  
25   anything like that? It reminded me tuh (.) not be there. 
 
Racial Common Sense in Interaction  33 
In his telling, Sammy shows that his friend’s motives for being at the scene of the 
assault were legitimate, being close to his place of work, and that he was not seeking any 
kind of trouble, but was merely “buy[ing] a six-pack of beer” on the way to a soccer 
game (lines 16-18). He thus discounts any possible conception that his friend in any way 
instigated the incident that led to him being assaulted. He goes on to describe the assault, 
and in doing so he portrays the attackers as being oriented to their own actions as 
requiring an explanation. That is, he reports the attackers’ speech in such a way that 
demonstrates their orientation to the need to account for their actions. This is seen in the 
way Sammy reports them as having accounted for the attack (“You shouldn’t be here,” 
line 21). There remains a puzzle, however, about what it was about the friend that made 
him the kind of “you” who should not have been at that place, such that the attackers 
were motivated to assault him for being there. As in the above instance, this puzzle can 
be solved through the racial common sense made relevant by Sammy’s prior racial 
categorization of his friend, in accordance with Sacks’ consistency rule. This common 
sense provides for the inference that the attackers were members of a different racial 
category than Sammy’s friend, and the attack was racially motivated, even though 
Sammy has made no explicit reference to the race of the attackers. 
By only alluding to the race of his friend’s attackers in formulating his story in 
this way, Sammy is able to complain about their racially motivated actions, while 
attenuating the similar inferences his recipients might have made about his own racial 
motivations had he explicitly racially identified them. Thus, he is able to convey that his 
friend was attacked because of his racial category membership, while working to avoid 
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being heard as proposing the racial category of the attackers to be an account for their 
actions. His orientation in this regard is also shown by his subsequent claim that the 
incident “reminded [him] not to be there” (line 19). In making this claim, Sammy shows 
that it is not his choice to see the world through a racial lens, but that his safety may 
depend on doing so in some cases, because other people see the world in that way (cf. 
Wieder 1974). In this way, Sammy uses this story (and the allusions to race therein) to 
support his claims about not always having racial privilege, while resisting the inference 
that he blames people of a particular racial category for what happened to his friend, and 
denying that this incident resulted in any racial prejudice on his part. 
The posing of puzzles such as those described here provide a practice for co-
implicating recipients who employ the common sense knowledge about racial categories 
necessary to make the inferences a racial hearing requires. By not explicitly mentioning 
the race of the actors in their utterances,
10
 while producing them in such a way that 
recipients will be left in no doubt about it, speakers can force their recipients to supply 
the common sense knowledge required to hear race as (obviously and apparently) 
relevant for understanding what happened, thus making them complicit in that racial 
common sense (cf. Smith 's 1978 analysis of the use of a puzzle to require recipients to 
collude in the interpretation of an individual’s behavior as being indicative of mental 
                                                 
10
 Excerpt 6 is particularly striking in this regard, since not only does Sammy not explicitly mention the 
race of the attackers, he avoids all references to them, even when he reports their speech and other actions, 
through his use of passive constructions. This serves to further “submerge” their racial identities as a 
concern to him.  
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illness). Speakers can thus show that actors were racially motivated in their actions, while 
minimizing possible inferences that they (the speakers) themselves were racially 
motivated in describing them (cf. Stokoe and Edwards 2007).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The practices I have described in this paper point to the operation of a framework of 
normative accountability that shapes the use of racial categories in describing and 
interpreting the social actions of others, particularly in normatively anti-racist 
environments. In such contexts, as a result of the consequentiality of “categorizing the 
categorizer,” speakers may be held accountable as members of a particular racial 
category for avoiding inappropriate references to race, while at the same time 
recognizing its potential relevance when it is appropriate to do so. This is apparent in the 
way speakers in my data visibly grappled with the problem of when and how race is 
relevant, and even whether their own actions were understandable as racially motivated 
(cf. Burkhalter 2006).   
The emergence (and in many cases, familiarity) of the practices I have described, 
and their recurrent use in the production of racial references to others, suggests that 
common sense reasoning and knowledge about race is sustained (i.e., reproduced and 
managed) at least in part through a specific mechanism. That is, in managing the 
accountability associated with “categorizing the categorizer,” speakers display an 
orientation to the relevance of their own racial identities, and the common sense 
knowledge associated with them, for how they report on and intervene in matters of race. 
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In this way, even as they work to manage the accountability of their conduct in terms of 
racial categories and common sense knowledge, speakers treat those categories and 
common sense knowledge as consequential, and thereby reproduce them as such (cf. 
Heritage’s 1988 demonstration of the way in which accounts renew the salience of the 
accounted for norm or event). This demonstrates one way in which “racial projects” (Omi 
and Winant 1994) carried out at the level of everyday interactions contribute to the 
reproduction of the category system underpinning the durable (racial) inequality Tilly 
(1998) describes. 
 While there is no doubt that race can be reproduced as a result of strong 
commitments to maintaining its importance as a form of social organization (cf. Tilly 
1998), the mechanism for the reproduction of race that I have demonstrated does not 
require such commitments in order to operate in the way that it does. That is, the 
consequentiality of “categorizing the categorizer” as (i.e., its status as a factor observably 
shaping people’s conduct) may be the result of the systematic potential for being held 
accountable for failing to attend to and use race appropriately, independently of whether 
one personally believes in the importance of race. Thus, individuals may design their 
actions according to a racial interpretive framework solely as a consequence of the 
expectation that others may be using such a framework to interpret their actions, and that 
others may hold them accountable for those actions on the basis of that framework (cf. 
West and Fenstermaker 1995). In this way, the status of race as a social structure that 
shapes the experiences of individuals (cf. Omi and Winant 1994), and which individuals 
treat as a constraint on their actions, is reproduced independently of whether any 
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particular individual is invested in or has a stake in it (cf. Wieder’s classic study of the 
operation of “the convict code” in a “halfway house” for drug offenders - Wieder 1974). 
It is further apparent, particularly from the examination of allusions to race, that 
the foregoing points concerning the reproduction of race apply not only to speakers (or 
those producing actions), but also to recipients (or those observing or hearing actions). 
Regardless of their personal beliefs about the importance of race, if recipients don’t apply 
racial common sense in interpreting the racial motivations of actors made relevant by 
speakers’ allusions to race, they will not be able to make adequate sense of the actions the 
speakers are describing. This provides a strong warrant for observers attempting to make 
sense of others’ actions to take account of their possible racial implications, even if those 
observers have no stake or investment in the relevance of race (cf. Wieder 1974). 
It is also important to emphasize the way in which the actions speakers employ 
these practices in the service of further reproduce race, by reflecting their orientation to 
their position within a racial social structure and the contingencies associated with that 
position. In my data, white speakers used the practices in doing such things as denying 
racial privilege (Excerpts 1b and 6), admitting to and accounting for racial prejudice 
(Excerpt 3) and denying racial prejudice (Excerpt 6). In this way, these speakers’ use of 
the practices displays their orientation to managing the implications of their whiteness for 
matters of privilege and prejudice. By contrast, people of color used the practices in the 
service of displaying alignment despite the barriers posed by race (Excerpt 2), avoiding 
singling white people out for criticism with respect to matters of race (Excerpt 2), 
describing the impacts of being subjected to prejudice and discrimination (Excerpts 4 and 
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5), and displaying caution in making accusations of discrimination (Excerpt 5). The use 
of these practices by speakers of color in the data thus demonstrates their management of 
the experiences associated with being in a stigmatized or subordinate position in a racial 
system. This constitutes another way in which durable inequalities of the sort that Tilly 
(1998) describes become consequential, and are reproduced, through “racial projects” 
(Omi and Winant 1994) undertaken in everyday interactions. 
 It should be emphasized that the generality of these findings may be limited by 
the particular interactional context in which they were generated, and that the range of 
actions for which these practices can be employed is most likely more extensive than 
those I have identified above. However, the mechanisms for the reproduction of race that 
they point to could be seen to be operating in any context in which practices such as the 
ones I have examined are employed. Further investigation in this regard could thus be 
directed at describing the use of these and other similar practices in other interactional 
environments, including those that are not as specialized or as strongly normatively “anti-
racist” as the one I have examined. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the practices I have described, and the 
forms of social organization they rely on, are underwritten by basic and ubiquitous 
features of talk-in-interaction. Practices for list construction, repair, and storytelling in 
conversation, and actions such as disagreeing, agreeing, admitting, denying, accusing and 
complaining are not particular to talk concerning race, but were mobilized by speakers in 
these interactions to perform particular projects in terms of race. This is to be expected 
since, regardless of the topical particulars of what speakers were doing, they were doing 
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it through talk-in-interaction, and thus needed to draw on available practices for doing 
talking-in-interaction (cf. Raymond and Heritage 2006). This makes clear the importance 
of understanding interaction at the level of detail at which participants attend to it in order 
to understand what people are doing in interactions in which important issues, such as 
race, are being dealt with. As Sacks (1987:67) succinctly puts it, “You cannot find what 
[people are] trying to do until you find the kinds of things they work with.” When applied 
to race, however, the ubiquitous interactional practices employed by speakers underwrite 
the consequentiality of race for the production of social action, contributing to the way in 
which race itself is organized and reproduced. 
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